

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 KINGSTON 2353

EXDIS

COUNTRY TEAM MESSAGE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, EAID, EFIN, JM, US
SUBJECT: US ASSISTANCE TO JAMAICA - THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
US COURSES OF ACTION

1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: DURING THE JUST COMPLETED US/
GOJ TALKS IN KINGSTON ON JAMAICA'S ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE
NEED FOR EXPANDED ASSISTANCE FROM THE US AND OTHER DONORS,
EMBASSY PREPARED FOR AMERICAN TEAM'S USE A PAPER DELINEATING
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FOUR POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION.
FOUR POSSIBILITIES ADDRESSED WERE:

-- A STATUS QUO APPROACH (WHICH WOULD HOLD ASSISTANCE FROM
ALL SOURCES AT THE PRESENTLY ESTIMATED \$65 MILLION
THROUGH THIS YEAR);

-- A MODEST EXPANSION IN OVERALL ASSISTANCE TO
JAMAICA WITHOUT ANY INCREASE IN AMERICAN SHARE (ESTI-
MATED TO BRING ASSISTANCE TO \$150 MILLION THROUGH END
OF YEAR);

-- A MORE GENEROUS EXPANSION IN WHICH US DOES PARTICIPATE
(LEVEL COULD REACH \$190 MILLION BY YEAR'S END); AND
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-- A SIGNIFICANT EXPANSION, TOGETHER WITH ASSURANCES OF
CONTRIBUTIONS IN SUCCEEDING YEARS (LEVEL THROUGH CURRENT
YEAR REMAINS AROUND \$190 MILLION WITH REASONABLE EXPEC-
TATIONS FOR MORE IN SUCCEEDING YEARS).

2. THE PAPER HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND LIGHTLY MODIFIED BY

COUNTRY TEAM. AS A COUNTRY TEAM STATEMENT, IT CONTINUES TO HOLD THAT:

- THERE ARE SEVERAL FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL FACTORS AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEMS WHICH WILL BE LITTLE AFFECTED BY WHATEVER COURSE IS ADOPTED.

-- ANY ASSISTANCE WE EXTEND CAN, HOWEVER, PROMOTE OUR INTERESTS IN JAMAICA AND BE PROTECTIVE OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

-- THE EXTENT TO WHICH OUR POLITICAL/ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND OUR HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERN ARE ADVANCED WILL BE IN DIRECT PROPORTION TO OUR GENEROSITY TOWARD JAMAICA. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT OUR ASSISTANCE TO WORK ANY BASIC CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL FUNDAMENTALS NOW EVIDENT HERE.

3. TO CONCLUDE, THE STRONGEST ARGUMENT FOR SIGNIFICANT EXPANSION OF US AND OTHER WESTERN ASSISTANCE IS NOT TO RESTORE THE JAMAICAN ECONOMY TO THE UNREAL HIGH PLATEAU OF THE RECENT PAST, BUT RATHER TO EASE THE TRANSITION TO A LOWER AND MORE REALISTIC PLATEAU WITH A MINIMUM OF HUNGER AND VIOLENCE, AND WITH MAXIMUM PROTECTION OF OUR INTEREST AND OF BASIC LIBERTIES AND RIGHTS. THE ALTERNATIVE IS A SHARP FALL TO AN EVEN LOWER LEVEL OF LIFE WITH ACCOMPANYING SOCIAL DISASTER. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

4. THE "GIVENS." IN CONSIDERING THE IMPLICATIONS OF ASSISTANCE TO JAMAICA OF WHATEVER SCOPE AND DURATION, THERE ARE CERTAIN FACTORS WHICH ARE BASIC:
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A) THE ELECTION OF DECEMBER 1976, WHICH RETURNED THE MANLEY GOVERNMENT TO POWER FOR A FURTHER FIVE-YEAR TERM WAS A DECISIVE MANDATE FOR THE PARTY'S POLICY OF "DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM," EVEN TAKING INTO ACCOUNT KNOWN ELECTION IRREGULARITIES. THERE IS NO REASON TO THINK THAT IT WILL BE ABANDONED WHICHEVER FACTION OF THE PNP HOLDS SWAY, PARTICULARLY WHILE MICHAEL MANLEY REMAINS PRIME MINISTER.

B) THE CURRENT ECLIPSE OF THE PEOPLE'S NATIONAL PARTY'S (PNP) RADICAL FACTION IS NOT LIKELY TO BE PERMANENT. THE RADICALS WILL TRY TO ASSERT THEMSELVES AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY. THEY STILL ENJOY THE SYMPATHY OF MANLEY, WHO SHARES MUCH OF THEIR ANALYSIS OF JAMAICA'S NEEDS. THEY ALSO HAVE A BROAD POPULAR POWER BASE AND CONTROL OF MUCH OF THE PNP'S GRASS-ROOTS MACHINE. ABOVE ALL, THEY HAVE IDEOLOGICAL MOTIVATION AND THE WILL TO POWER.

C) JAMAICA'S -- AND MANLEY'S -- COMMITMENT TO NON-ALIGNMENT

AND TO THE THIRD WORLD IS NOT EPHEMERAL. MOREOVER, THE COMMITMENT TO "DIVERSIFY" DIPLOMATIC, TRADE AND ASSISTANCE LINKS IS FIRM AND REAL. HOWEVER GENEROUS WE MAY BE, THERE IS NO LIKELIHOOD THAT JAMAICA WILL ALTER ITS BASIC FOREIGN POLICIES. WERE THE PNP'S MODERATE FACTION TOTALLY IN CONTROL, THE RHETORIC WOULD BE MORE MUTED, BUT THAT IS ALL.

D) JAMAICA'S DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEMS WILL PERSIST, AND RENDER ASSISTANCE GOAL ACCOMPLISHMENT DIFFICULT. UNEMPLOYMENT PRESENTLY EXCEEDS 25 PERCENT, AND IS INCREASING. ONLY EMIGRATION HAS KEPT POPULATION GROWTH FROM BEING EXPLOSIVE. SIXTH PERCENT OF THE POPULATION ARE UNDER 20 YEARS OF AGE. INTERNAL MIGRATION CONTINUES TO SWELL KINGSTON'S POPULATION (AN ESTIMATED ONE-THIRD OF THE ISLAND'S PEOPLE LIVE IN THE CAPITAL). UNEMPLOYMENT, THE LOSS OF SOCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE PAUCITY OF CIVIL
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AMENITIES INSURE THAT ANOMIE FLOURISHES AS IN OTHER BURGEONING THIRD WORLD CITIES.

5. OUR INTERESTS -- AND A DEEPLY-HELD CONCERN. IN CONSIDERING GREATER ASSISTANCE THAN PREVIOUSLY, WE MUST REMEMBER THE MOST BASIC INTERESTS WE SEEK TO PROMOTE AND PROTECT IN THE COURSE OF THE CONDUCT OF OUR RELATIONS WITH JAMAICA:

A) ACCESS TO BAUXITE AND ALUMINA. JAMAICA IS THE SOURCE OF 53 PERCENT OF OUR BAUXITE IMPORTS AND 25 PERCENT OF ALUMINA IMPORTS. MOREOVER, OUR INVESTMENT IN JAMAICA'S BAUXITE IS ROUGHLY \$800 MILLION.

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B) THE DEVELOPMENT OF A STABLE SYSTEM OF CARIBBEAN STATES. IN THIS PROCESS, JAMAICA CAN EXERCISE SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE. SUCH INFLUENCE, USED AGAINST THE US, WOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT NEGATIVE EFFECT. IT NEED NOT, HOWEVER, POST A THREAT TO ANY VITAL AMERICAN INTEREST.

C) AN EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH AN INFLUENTIAL MEMBER OF THE THIRD WORLD.

6. A DISPLAY OF GENEROSITY ON OUR PART CAN ONLY ADVANCE THESE INTERESTS. WHETHER IT WOULD OFFER AN EFFECTIVE COUNTER TO CUBAN CHARGES THAT OUR POLICIES IN THE CARIBBEAN FLOW FROM AN IMPERIALIST, RACIST BASIS REMAINS TO BE ANSWERED.

7. IN ADDITION TO OUR INTERESTS, ONE OF OUR CHIEF CONCERNS IS AN EVIDENT IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH JAMAICA AS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. THE PRESERVATION OF DEMOCRATIC FORMS AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ARE MATTERS OF FIRST PRIORITY. JAMAICA IS STILL A DEMOCRACY, WITH A GOOD IF SOMEWHAT BLEMISHED HUMAN RIGHTS' RECORD. INDEED, NO MATTER HOW TARNISHED, THE RECORD IN THESE AREAS IS VASTLY SUPERIOR TO THAT OF NEARLY ALL OF OUR SOUTHERN NEIGHBORS. IT IS THEREFORE IM-
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PORTANT TO REINFORCE JAMAICA'S COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES. JAMAICA'S OWN INTERESTS WOULD, WE THINK, COINCIDE WITH OUR CONCERN.

8. SCENARIOS. IT IS PRESENTLY CLEAR THAT UNLESS JAMAICA RECEIVES ADEQUATE ASSISTANCE TO CLOSE THE GAP BETWEEN THE 1977 \$750 MILLION FOREIGN EXCHANGE REQUIREMENTS AND THE \$550 MILLION IT CAN REASONABLY HOPE TO OBTAIN, IT WILL HAVE A PROBLEM OF CRISIS PROPORTIONS. THE CHARACTER AND EXTENT OF OUR RESPONSE AND THAT OF OTHER WESTERN DONORS CAN VERY DIRECTLY AFFECT JAMAICA'S COURSE FOR YEARS TO COME.

9. SCENARIO I. IF NO HELP (OTHER THAN LOW CURRENT LEVELS) IS FORTHCOMING FROM THE US, FROM THE IMF, AND FROM OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED TO RESPOND, JAMAICA WILL SOON ENCOUNTER SERIOUS

SHORTAGES OF BASIC COMMODITIES, A SHARP INCREASE IN INFLATION, INCREASED WAGE DEMANDS, AND SHARPLY INCREASING UNEMPLOYMENT. THE RATE COULD QUICKLY EXCEED 40 PERCENT. IN THIS SETTING, THE DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS NOTED ABOVE WILL INSURE A VERY HIGH POTENTIAL FOR SEVERE UNREST IN A SOCIETY ALREADY PRONE TO VIOLENCE. SHOULD SUCH UNREST OCCUR, THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT WOULD BE:

A) A RENEWED, INTENSIFIED SEARCH FOR ASSISTANCE IN EASTERN EUROPE, PAST EXPERIENCE NOTWITHSTANDING.

B) PROMPT RELIANCE ON AUTHORITARIANISM TO QUIET RESULTANT VIOLENCE, POLITICAL UNREST, AND POSSIBLE FOOD RIOTS. REPRESSIVE MEASURES WOULD NECESSARILY BE FAR IN EXCESS OF THOSE EVIDENT UNDER THE CURRENT -- IF NEARLY ENDED -- STATE OF EMERGENCY. THERE IS NO CERTAINTY THAT JAMAICAN SECURITY FORCES CAN CONTAIN UNREST OF THE MAGNITUDE WHICH COULD OCCUR, PARTICULARLY IF IT SPREAD BEYOND KINGSTON AND/OR IF IT IS SUSTAINED.

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C) THE DISCREDITING OF THE MODERATES WOULD BE COMPLETE. MOREOVER, THERE IS A STRONG LIKELIHOOD THAT MANLEY'S POLITICAL IMAGE WOULD BE SERIOUSLY ERODED AND HIS ABILITY TO CONTROL THE RADICALS UNDERMINED. THE MORE IDEOLOGICAL AND LESS PRAGMATIC AMONG THE RADICALS WHO HAVE CAREFULLY DISTANCED THEMSELVES FROM MANLEY AND THE CURRENT MODERATE COURSE COULD BE THE PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES.

D) A QUICKENING EMIGRATION OF THOSE STILL ABLE TO LEAVE WOULD ENSUE. PROMINENT AMONG THOSE DEPARTING COULD WELL BE THE TECHNICAL PERSONNEL (INCLUDING MOST AMERICANS) AT BAUXITE AND ALUMINA FACILITIES. THE WHOLESAL DEPARTURE OF THIS GROUP COULD EASILY RESULT IN THE CLOSEDOWN OF BAUXITE/ALUMINA PLANTS, THUS IMPERILING A BASIC US NATIONAL INTEREST.

10. OVER THE LONGER RUN, WE WOULD EXPECT:

A) CUBA COULD BECOME THE DOMINANT FOREIGN INFLUENCE, WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN THE BACKGROUND.

B) THE CONCEPT OF PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE JAMAICAN GOVERNMENT AND AMERICAN ALUMINUM COMPANIES WOULD DISAPPEAR. MOVEMENT TO EXPROPRIATION OF REMAINING AMERICAN BAUXITE INTERESTS COULD BE INEVITABLE.

C. PROBABLE ULTIMATE EMERGENCE OF JAMAICA AS A SINGLE PARTY STATE WITH LITTLE CONCERN FOR EITHER POLITICAL OR HUMAN

RIGHTS.

D) JAMAICA'S ROLE IN THE CARIBBEAN WOULD BE OPENLY
AND ACTIVELY ANTITHETICAL TO AMERICAN INTERESTS.

E) JAMAICA WOULD GRAVITATE TO THE MOST RADICAL BLOC
WITHIN THE THIRD WORLD. ANY HOPE FOR A JAMAICAN MODERA-
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TING ROLE WILL GO AGLIMMERING.

11. SCENARIO II. IF MODEST HELP IS FORTHCOMING FROM
OTHER SOURCES, BUT US ASSISTANCE REMAINS AT CURRENT
LEVELS, EVEN IF THE QUANTUM OF ASSISTANCE IS ADEQUATE TO COVER
MOST CRUCIAL IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENTS (A RESULT THAT REQUIRES
PARTICULARLY DEFT MANAGEMENT BY THE JAMAICANS), WE CAN
EXPECT THAT IN THE IMMEDIATE TERM:

A) THE DANGER OF VIOLENCE AND OTHER UNREST WITH ITS SERIOUS
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES, WILL BE REDUCED. HOWEVER,
THE POTENTIAL REMAINS AND COULD AFFECT, INTER ALIA, BAUXITE/
ALUMINA PLANT OPERATION.

B) THE US, HOWEVER, WILL LOSE SUCH EXPECTATIONS AS IT
MIGHT PRESENTLY ENTERTAIN OF EXERCISING INFLUENCE IN JAMAICA.
THERE PROBABLY WOULD BE A RETURN TO THE ACTIVE ANTI-AMERICAN
RHETORIC OF THE RECENT PAST.

C) THE MODERATES, IF THEY SURVIVE POLITICALLY, WILL NOT
WISH TO BE IDENTIFIED WITH THE US. THEY WILL ADOPT POSITIONS
WHICH BRING THEM CLOSER TO THE MORE EXTREME RADICALS.

D) THE SEARCH FOR EASTERN EUROPEAN ASSISTANCE WILL REMAIN
ACTIVE.

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12. IN THE LONGER TERM, WE WOULD NOT EXPECT JAMAICA TO REACT AS VIGOROUSLY AS IF WE AND ALL OTHER PROSPECTIVE WESTERN DONORS STOOD IDLE. NEVERTHELESS, OUR INTERESTS WOULD BE DAMAGED, AND, AS IN SCENARIO I, WE MUST EXPECT:

A) MUCH ENHANCED CUBAN AND SOVIET INFLUENCE.

B) MANY MORE DIFFICULTIES FOR AMERICAN ALUMINUM FIRMS.

C) SHARP CRITICISM OF THE US IN CARIBBEAN/AND THIRD WORLD FORA WHERE JAMAICA WILL IDENTIFY ITSELF WITH THE MORE RADICAL VOICES.

D) THE GRADUAL DISAPPEARANCE OF MODERATE SENTIMENT AND AN EROSION OF CONCERN FOR REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

13. SCENARIO III - IF THE US PROVIDES EXPANDED BUT STILL MODEST PROJECT ASSISTANCE, AND OTHER WESTERN SOURCES ARE ALSO FORTHCOMING, THEN MUCH WILL TURN ON JAMAICA'S EXPECTATIONS FOR COMING YEARS. IF THERE IS NO PROMISE OF MORE TO COME IN SUCCEEDING YEARS, THEN WE SHOULD EXPECT THE CONFIDENTIAL

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SHORT TERM TO BE MARKED BY:

A) A CONTINUING SEARCH FOR NEW SOURCES OF ASSISTANCE -- BUT EQUALLY TRADE - IN EASTERN EUROPE.

B) SUSPICIONS -- ENCOURAGED BY THE JAMAICAN LEFT -- ABOUT BASIC AMERICAN INTENTIONS. THESE CAN ERODE THE ALREADY WEAK CONFIDENCE OF THE MODERATES AND WHATEVER SHORT TERM GAINS WE MAY MAKE IN OUR RELATIONSHIPS.

C) A MEASURE OF IMMOBILISME ON THE PART OF THE BUREAUCRACY GIVEN THE ABSENCE OF PREDICTABILITY. THIS WOULD BE MORE BROADLY EVIDENT AS CIVIL SERVANTS REFLECT ON THE CHARACTER OF THEIR PROBABLE NEXT SET OF POLITICAL MASTERS.

D) THE LIKELIHOOD OF UNREST IS REDUCED SIGNIFICANTLY, BUT UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE FUTURE WILL UNDERMINE PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS AND THE COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS -- NOT TO MENTION THE WILL AND CONFIDENCE OF THE JAMAICAN PRIVATE SECTOR, AND FOREIGN INVESTORS' ATTITUDES.

14. SCENARIO IV. IF THE US TOGETHER WITH OTHER WESTERN DONORS PROVIDES SIGNIFICANT ASSISTANCE (I.E., BOTH PROJECT AND PROGRAM) IN THE REMAINDER OF THIS YEAR, AND IF THEY INDICATE THAT THEY WILL BE FORTHCOMING OVER THE SUCCEEDING THREE TO FIVE YEARS, THEN WE CAN EXPECT THAT OVER THE SHORT RUN:

A) THE DANGER OF UNREST WILL BE SHARPLY REDUCED.

B) THE MODERATES WILL BE CONFIRMED IN THEIR WISDOM.

C) DIRECT AMERICAN INTERESTS -- MOST PARTICULARLY THE ALUMINUM COMPANIES -- WILL BE AFFORDED AS MUCH PROTECTION AS IT IS POSSIBLE TO GIVE.

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D) CONFIDENCE IN JAMAICA'S FUTURE MAY NOT BE PROMPTLY RESTORED, BUT A BEGINNING WILL BE MADE WHICH WILL ENCOURAGE COMMERCIAL BANKERS AND PROSPECTIVE INVESTORS.

D) THE BUREAUCRACY AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR MAY FEEL GREATER CONFIDENCE WITH A RESULTANT MULTIPLIER EFFECT ON DEVELOPMENTAL EFFICIENCY.

15. OVER THE LONGER RUN:

A) JAMAICA WOULD FEEL FREE TO FOLLOW A MORE TRULY NONALIGNED POLICY.

B) WITHIN THE CARIBBEAN, JAMAICA WOULD SEE NO NEED TO PLAY A ROLE HOSTILE TO THE US. IT WOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THE US RECOGNIZE THE SOVEREIGN CHARACTER OF ITS NEIGHBORS.

C) WHILE THE CUBAN INFLUENCE WOULD CONTINUE, IT COULD WELL BE DILUTED.

D) ON NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE WORLD'S ECONOMY, WE WOULD EXPECT TO FIND JAMAICA MORE SENSITIVE TO OUR CONCERNS AND MORE READY TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE SEARCH FOR REALIZABLE SOLUTIONS.

16. CAVEATS: ALL OF THE ABOVE IS PREDICATED ON AN ASSUMPTION

THAT THE JAMAICANS ARE CAPABLE OF MANAGING THEIR ECONOMY REASONABLY SUCCESSFULLY. THIS IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN, GIVEN THE PAST TRACK RECORD OF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT. THUS, THE SCENARIOS SHOWN ABOVE -- EVEN THE WORST -- MAY SUFFER FROM A MODICUM OF UNWARRANTED OPTIMISM.

17. AS STRESSED AT THE OPENING OF THIS TELEGRAM, THERE ARE SOME POLITICAL FEATURES WHICH DO NOT LEND THEMSELVES TO READY CHANGE, NOR IS CHANGE NECESSARY TO THE PROMOTION
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AND PROTECTION OF OUR INTERESTS -- AND CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. HOWEVER, THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE DISPLAY GENEROSITY CAN AFFECT THE IMPACT OF THE POLITICAL "GIVENS." THUS, THE DECISIONS WHICH WILL MOST POWERFULLY AND IMMEDIATELY AFFECT THE CHARACTER OF OUR RELATIONS WITH JAMAICA ARE OURS.

18. CONCLUSION: GIVEN THE SHARP DECLINE IN THE STANDARD OF LIVING WHICH JAMAICA MUST ACCEPT AND THE STRONG POSSIBILITY OF PERIODIC SHORTAGES OF NECESSITIES OF LIFE, THE ARGUMENTS FAVORING ASSISTANCE ON A PREDICTABLE BASIS WHICH ARISE OUT OF OUR NEED TO PROTECT AND PROMOTE OUR INTERESTS MAY BE OVERSHADOWED BY ONE PREDICATED ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS. IF SHORTAGES LEAD TO VIOLENT AND WIDESPREAD UNREST WHICH THREATENS THE FABRIC OF JAMAICA'S ALREADY FRAGILE SOCIETY, THAT UNREST WILL BE THE RESULT OF HUNGER AND DESPAIR. SURELY THESE CAN BE COUNTERED ON THIS SMALL, AND DISADVANTAGED ISLAND. IN THIS SITUATION, THE STRONGEST ARGUMENT FOR SIGNIFICANT EXPANSION OF US AND OTHER WESTERN ASSISTANCE IS NOT TO RESTORE THE JAMAICAN ECONOMY TO THE UNREAL HIGH PLATEAU OF THE RECENT PAST, BUT RATHER TO EASE THE TRANSITION TO A LOWER AND MORE REALISTIC PLATEAU WITH A MINIMUM OF HUNGER AND VIOLENCE, AND WITH MAXIMUM PROTECTION OF BASIC LIBERTIES AND RIGHTS. THE ALTERNATIVE IS A SHARP FALL TO AN EVEN LOWER LEVEL OF LIFE WITH ACCOMPANYING SOCIAL DISASTER.
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